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COMMENT

Internet Gaming Tax Regulation:
Can Old Laws Learn New Tricks?
David H. Lantzer*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The tide is changing in Internet gaming law and practice. Internet gaming has been largely restricted to countries with little
or no regulatory structure, whereas first-world countries such as
the United States, Canada, and several in the European Union
prohibit the establishment of Internet gaming facilities. However,
these prohibitions have not had the intended result of restricting
the growth of Internet gambling. Not only has Internet gaming in
countries with lax regulation grown, but officials in countries such
as Australia and Great Britain have legalized Internet gaming establishments in an effort to internalize gaming revenue.1
A lively discussion that ensued in 1995 continues today regarding the merits of prohibition and legalization of Internet gaming in the United States. These issues are largely beyond the
scope of this Comment. The focus of this Comment is analysis of
regulatory schemes after legalization. Therefore, part one begins
with a short discussion of current world events that point to the
* Juris Doctor Candidate, Chapman University School of Law (anticipated graduation date May 2002). I would like to thank the staff and editors of Chapman Law Review
for their hard work. Special thanks to Mark D. Schopper for his ideas and inspiration,
Kelly M. Craig for her tireless efforts in making this comment better, and Professor Tom
W. Bell for his insight and wise comments. Copyright 2002, David H. Lantzer, all rights
reserved.
1 See Mike Brunker, Australia, U.S. at Odds on Net Betting, at http://www.msnbc.
com/NEWS/287419.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Brunker, Australia, U.S. at
Odds]; Mike Brunker, Britain Embraces Internet Gambling, at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/540530.asp (last visited Nov. 4, 2001) [hereinafter Brunker, Britain Embraces].
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likelihood of legalization in the Unite States and the need for regulation. Part two discusses federal and state regulatory issues.
Federal issues discussed include the Commerce Clause, statutes
already in place that allow for the collection of wagering taxes,
and federal revenue sharing. The discussion of state regulation of
gaming concentrates on states’ power to regulate gaming under
the police power and multi-state lotteries. Finally, part three
makes proposals for collection and allocation of Internet gaming
tax revenues that will allow states to maintain their traditional
control of gaming while exploiting a new source of revenue.
A. The Inevitability of Internet Gaming?
Internet gaming has largely been an offshore industry since
its introduction in 1995.2 However, a shift is occurring, and countries that once prohibited Internet gaming are looking at new possibilities for legalization and regulation.3 Two primary benefits
exist for Internet gaming companies located in countries with little or no regulation. The first benefit is cost savings from the lack
of regulation. Internet gaming companies receive a warm welcome from countries such as Costa Rica because the companies
create high paying jobs with benefits.4 Companies, in turn, find
Costa Rica attractive because it has loose laws regulating Internet
gaming, and companies operate under municipal licenses.5 The licensing fees in countries such as Costa Rica and Antigua are often
much less than licensing fees for casinos in the United States.6
2 See generally Mark G. Tratos, Gaming on the Internet III: The Politics of Internet
Gaming and the Genesis of Legal Bans or Licensing, 610 PLI/Pat 711, 719-22 (2000); Seth
Gorman & Antony Loo, Blackjack or Bust: Can U.S. Law Stop Internet Gambling?, 16 LOY.
L.A. ENT. L. J. 667-69 (1996).
3 Most notably, Australia and Great Britain recently enacted laws that allow casinos
in these countries to accept bets and wagers over the Internet. See Brunker, Australia,
U.S. at Odds, supra note 1; Brunker, Britain Embraces, supra note 1.
4 Marianela Jimenez, Costa Rica A Paradise for Online Gambling Firms Lax Regulations and Cheap Labor Force Lure Offshore Bookies Catering to U.S. Residents, PRESS DEMOCRAT (Santa Rosa, Cal.), Oct. 25, 2000, at A13, available at 2000 WL 24341002.
5 Id.
6 Id. Antigua charges a licensing fee of one hundred thousand dollars per year. Id.
In October 2000, Costa Rica announced that it would require Internet gaming operators to
undergo background checks and pay a $150,000 licensing fee. I. Nelson Rose, Gambling
and the Law: Understanding the Law of Internet Gambling, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY,
SF89 ALI-ABA 175, 204 (2001) [hereinafter Rose, Understanding the Law]. Conversely,
Nevada’s Internet gaming bill proposes to charge five hundred thousand dollars every two
years for licensing plus a six percent tax on all Internet gaming profits. Mike Brunker, Net
Betting Bill Signed in Nevada, at www.msnbc.com/news/578499.asp (last visited Nov. 4,
2001) [hereinafter Brunker, Net Betting]. In addition to charging lower licensing fees, Antigua’s flat fee is significantly less complicated to calculate than licensing fees charged by
Nevada—such as $250 per slot machine, NEV. REV. STAT. 463.385 (2001); a ten percent
excise tax on all amounts paid for admission, food, drink, and merchandise sold in a casino,
NEV. REV. STAT. 463.401 (2001); and up to one thousand dollars per game in an establishment, NEV. REV. STAT. 463.380 (2001). While these fees apply only to land based casinos, it
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The second advantage to locating offshore is that Internet
gaming companies do not have to worry about liability under U.S.
federal or state law. No U.S. statutes specifically address Internet
gaming.7 However, the section on transmission of wagers in the
federal Wire Act8 prohibits the use of a “wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce of
bets.”9 The Wire Act was enacted prior to the emergence of the
Internet, but because Internet communications are generally carried over wires, the statute applies.10 The Wire Act raises serious
questions regarding criminal liability for operating Internet gaming sites in the United States.11 Penalties for Wire Act violations
may include loss of a state gaming license or seizure of property if
U.S. state and federal courts are able to assert jurisdiction.12
The advantages of setting up Internet gaming sites offshore
are outweighed by the opportunity to profit from legalized Internet gaming in the United States and other first-world countries. Estimates of Internet wagering are in the hundreds of
millions of dollars, but the exact figure is unknown.13 These large
amounts are attributed to increased Internet access, especially in
the United States; improvements in software that allow for instantaneous gaming and improved sound and graphics; increased
confidence in online financial transactions; and licensing measures in countries such as Australia and Antigua.14 Revenues will
likely increase as the chilling effects of complicated financial
transactions are removed by Internet gaming companies in countries with sophisticated regulatory systems.15 The likely reason
for the anticipated increase is consumer comfort. Established and
reputable casinos are more attractive to bettors because of consumer recognition of an established brand name, guaranteed
paybacks, and the stability of a “brick and mortar” establishis likely that fees charged to Internet gaming providers in the United States will have
similar complications.
7 I. Nelson Rose, Gambling and the Law: Internet Gambling: Statutes and International Law, ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY, SE81 ALI-ABA 231, 234 (2000) [hereinafter Rose,
Statutes and International Law].
8 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
9 Id.
10 Gorman & Loo, supra note 2, at 671.
11 Id. at 671-72.
12 Rose, Understanding the Law, supra note 6, at 204-05.
13 NAT’L GAMBLING IMPACT STUDY COMM’N, FINAL REPORT, at 2-15 to 2-16 (1999) available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/ngisc/index.html [hereinafter NGISC FINAL REPORT].
The Report cites two studies that estimate Internet gaming revenues at $300 to $445.4
million in 1997, and $651 to $919.1 million in 1998. Id. While a dispute exists regarding
the exact amounts, both studies estimate that revenue doubled from 1997 to 1998. Id.
14 Id. at 2-16.
15 See Mark G. Tratos, Gaming on the Internet, 3 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 101, 111-12
(1997).
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ment.16 Established gaming companies will continue to lobby for
legalization and regulation of Internet gaming in the United
States and other countries in order to capitalize on the will of
consumers.17
The lure of increased revenue and consumer preference will
likely result in federal and state governments enacting legislation
to legalize and regulate Internet gaming. Federal and state governments are continually trying to collect greater amounts of
much-wanted revenue.18 Taxes and licensing fees on Internet
gaming offer state and federal governments a large and previously
untapped source of revenue.19 Because Internet gaming is a new
source of revenue, few laws govern the amount of revenue that
might be realized.20 Governments have the authority to enact legislation and promulgate regulations that will maximize revenues
while allowing for the growth of Internet gaming. A relatively
clean slate encourages governments and businesses to negotiate
regulatory solutions that will benefit all parties.
B. The Need for Regulatory Models
It is in the best interests of federal and state governments to
find ways of policing the industry since it appears legalization of
Internet gaming would provide a valuable new source of tax revenue. The goals of regulation should be to provide stability, collect
and distribute tax revenue, prevent gambling by minors and problem gamblers, prevent the influence of criminal elements, and ensure fair games with known odds.21 The need exists for
regulations addressing collection and allocation of gaming tax revenues because federal and state governments lack an incentive to
pass Internet gaming regulations without the carrot of additional
tax revenue.
16 Id.; Stevie A. Kish, Betting on the Net: An Analysis of the Government’s Role in
Addressing Internet Gambling, 51 FED. COMM. L.J. 449, 453-54 (1999).
17 In fact, some large casino owners such as MGM Mirage, Park Place Entertainment,
and Harrah’s Entertainment are actively lobbying for Internet gaming and have already
developed “for-fun” gaming that can be transformed into for-profit gaming in a very short
time. Mike Brunker, Online Gambling Goes Global, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/
544764.asp (last visited Nov. 1, 2001) [hereinafter Brunker, Online Gambling].
18 Tratos, supra note 15, at 113-14.
19 Id. Nevada casinos collected $9.6 billion in winnings and paid $561.5 million to the
state in taxes in 2000. Jeff Simpson, Experts Promote Legalization of Internet Gambling,
LAS VEGAS REV.-J., May 16, 2001, at 3D, available at 2001 WL 9534745. Current projections of worldwide Internet gaming taxed at the rate of 6.25% could generate approximately $156 million in new tax revenue. Id.
20 See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing I.R.C. § 4401).
21 Bradford S. Smith, Roundtable Discussion: The Role of Regulators, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY, SC91 ALI-ABA 465 (1998). Industry stability, problem gambling prevention, crime, and fairness are beyond the scope of this comment; for a discussion on these
issues see NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 5-4 to 5-6; Kish, supra note 16, at 45354.
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No commercial Internet gaming sites currently exist in the
United States. Most sites are located in the Caribbean, Central
and South America, and Australia.22 Geography is not a bar to
Americans who want to use the Internet for gambling. The great
appeal of the Internet is that it allows the transmission of data
across large distances, including national and international borders.23 The Internet creates a problem for legislators and courts
because of the difficulty of enforcing judgments against foreignbased operations.24 Federal and state governments are largely
powerless to enforce penalties against foreign Internet gaming
companies because of a lack of personal jurisdiction.25
Legislative attempts to ban Internet gaming have been unsuccessful, and proposed legislation will also be ineffective as long
as bettors are exempt from prosecution.26 Arizona Senator Jon
Kyl introduced the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999.27
The proposed bill would have significantly amended the Internet
Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997 that the Senate approved, but
the full Congress did not pass.28 Placing any bet on the Internet
would have been a federal offense under the 1997 act.29 The 1999
See discussion supra Part I.A.
The Internet has been variously described as “a medium through which people in
real space in one jurisdiction communicate with people in real space in another jurisdiction;
. . . a collection of networks; a giant network which interconnects innumerable smaller
groups of linked computer networks; and a decentralized, global medium of communications.” Tom Lundin Jr., The Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999: Congress Stacks
the Deck Against Online Wagering but Deals in Traditional Gaming Industry High Rollers,
16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 845, 858 (2000) (internal quotation omitted) (citations omitted). The
federal government defines the Internet as “[t]he international computer network of both
Federal and non-Federal interoperable packet switched data networks.” Id. at 859 (quoting the Electronic Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1) (1998) (alteration in
original)).
24 Lundin, supra note 23, at 862. One method of dealing with the problem is through
treaties. See, e.g., Rose, Statutes and International Law, supra note 7, at 250-52. The difficulty is in enforcement of prohibitions rather than in asserting jurisdiction over Internet
gaming sites. In State v. Granite Gate Resorts, Inc., No. C6-95-7227, 1996 WL 767431, at
*1 (D. Minn. Dec. 11, 1996), the Attorney General of Minnesota successfully brought suit
against an Internet sports wagering company incorporated in Nevada, with its primary
place of business in Belize. Minimum contacts were established by the amount of advertising on the Internet that reached Minnesota. Id. at *6-7. The fact that defendants kept
track of users proved they knew that computers in Minnesota were accessing the site. Id.
at *8. Defendant purposely availed itself of Minnesota law by including a provision on its
site that said the company had a right to file action against users in the user’s home forum
or in Belize. Id. at *11.
25 Conducting Internet gaming may be a criminal offense under federal and state
laws, but enforcing penalties against foreign nationals is difficult. The United States has
extradition treaties that allow extradition for criminal fraud, but no treaties exist for extradition for illegal gambling. Rose, Statutes and International Law, supra note 7, at 251. For
a thorough discussion of the difficulties governments face in asserting personal jurisdiction
over Internet gaming companies see Anthony N. Cabot & Robert D. Faiss, Sports Gambling
in the Cyberspace Era, 5 CHAP. L. REV. 1 (2002).
26 See discussion infra notes 27-43 and accompanying text.
27 S. 692, 106th Cong. (1999).
28 Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1997, H.R. 2380, 105th Cong. (1997).
29 See Lundin, supra note 23, at 865.
22
23
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bill would have exempted individual bettors from federal prosecution for placing wagers via the Internet.30 States may still bring
criminal prosecution under state law against individual bettors
who place wagers on the Internet, but the federal government has
yet to pass a bill specifically outlawing Internet gaming.
Any law that criminalizes placing bets over the Internet will
face serious enforcement difficulties. The basic problem is identification of gamblers who place bets at offshore Internet casinos.31
The identities of individual gamblers may be hidden from law enforcement as encryption technology becomes more prevalent.32
The second problem is that in order to bring a criminal action
against bettors, law enforcement will need to intercept betting information while it is being transmitted. The nature of the Internet as a decentralized network or series of networks makes it
very difficult for officials to know where to place a tap on communication lines.33 Law enforcement will not have the evidence necessary for conviction without intercepted bets. Finally, law
enforcement may be reluctant to attempt enforcement of Internet
gaming prohibitions because of doubt about the success of enforcement efforts both domestically and internationally.34 A complete
ban on Internet gaming will not effectuate the desired goals of
providing stability, preventing problem gambling, ensuring the
fairness of games, and providing revenue due to these enforcement difficulties. Internet gaming will continue to exist overseas
at unregulated sites because bettors will not be sufficiently discouraged from participating in illegal gambling.
Regulation of Internet gaming offers a preferred solution to
the perceived problems of Internet gaming for several reasons.
First, federal and state governments can obtain results through
regulation that are unattainable with a ban on Internet gaming.
Gambling in some form is legal and regulated in forty-eight states
and the District of Columbia.35 Laws that address public and legislators’ concerns already exist.36 Casino regulators perform background checks on companies applying for casino licenses, casino
employees, and companies doing business with casinos in order to
Id. at 851.
Regulation will not face the same difficulty in identifying gamblers because the
gamblers will willingly provide identifying information in order to access Internet gaming
sites. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
32 Kish, supra note 16, at 463.
33 Gorman & Loo, supra note 2, at 691.
34 Kish, supra note 16, at 462-63.
35 See Ronald J. Rychlak, The Introduction of Casino Gambling: Public Policy and the
Law, 64 MISS. L. J. 291, 303-04 (1995). Hawaii and Utah are the only states that prohibit
all forms of gambling. Id. at 304. In 1994, thirty-seven states and the District of Columbia
conducted lotteries; twenty-four states allowed Indian gaming; six states allowed riverboat
gambling; and twenty-three states allowed casino gambling. Id.
36 See generally Smith, supra note 21.
30
31
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prevent the influence of organized crime.37 Additionally, regulators set the rules of games and promote fair games by ensuring
that casinos pay out the required amount to gamblers.38 Operators have an interest in following regulations in states that allow
gaming and abiding by laws in states that do not allow gambling
in order to protect their licenses.39 Finally, casinos welcome Internet gaming legislation and pledge to assist governments in regulating Internet gaming.40 The casinos maintain that regulation
of Internet gaming will be relatively easy because an electronic
record of each bet will be created. These electronic records will
allow for “precise auditing and control.”41 With current software,
prohibiting underage gambling will still be a problem.42 However,
if casinos develop more reliable age verification procedures they
may be able to accurately determine the bettor’s age, monitor bets,
and restrict problem gamblers.43 Legalization and regulation allow legislators to accomplish the goals of limiting Internet gaming
and generating revenues with the willing assistance of casinos.
The regulatory solution is preferable to a ban because regulation
will generate revenue and ultimately offer more control over Internet gaming than an unenforceable ban.
II.

EXISTING REGULATORY MODELS:
POSSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS

The two possible sources of laws to regulate Internet gaming
are the Commerce Clause44 and the police powers retained by the
states.45 Federal laws exist or may be enacted to regulate Internet
gaming under the Commerce Clause. Such laws provide a framework for collection and distribution of revenues from Internet
gaming. On the other hand, states may enact laws to regulate
gaming under the police power. State legislatures will determine
whether their citizens can use the Internet to place bets at regulated casinos and sports books. Effective regulation of Internet
gaming should incorporate elements of both state and federal law.
Id. at 467.
Id. at 468.
Kish, supra note 16, at 464.
Internet Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony of Sue Schneider, Managing Editor and Chief
Executive Officer of Rolling Good Times OnLine), [hereinafter Schneider testimony] available at 1998 WL 58226.
41 Id.
42 Simpson, supra note 19.
43 Id.
44 “The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
45 Police powers retained by the states are affirmed in the Tenth Amendment of the
Constitution. “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” U.S.
CONST. amend. X.
37
38
39
40
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A. Federal Regulation
1. Congress’s Power to Regulate Internet Gaming Under
the Commerce Clause
Congress can clearly regulate Internet gaming under the
Commerce Clause. The Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate commerce with foreign nations or among the several
states.46 Placing bets across state or international lines falls into
the category of commerce among the several states or with foreign
nations for several reasons. First, bets travel through channels of
interstate commerce—phone lines and the Internet. Second, instrumentalities of interstate commerce—money or credit—are
traveling through those channels. Furthermore, current reports
on Internet gambling reveal that the amounts of money being wagered over the Internet are sizeable.47 The amounts being wagered support the conclusion that Internet wagering has a
substantial impact on interstate commerce.
However, it is not clear whether Congress can regulate Internet gaming that is restricted to intrastate systems such as
closed circuit Internet gaming, purchasing state lottery tickets via
the Internet, or pari-mutuel betting48 using the Internet.49 It may
be argued that congressional regulation or a ban on purely intrastate activities may violate the Commerce Clause because intrastate activities would not satisfy the “substantially affect[ing]
interstate commerce”50 requirement for the federal government’s
legislation to be constitutional.51 However, the Court in United
46 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. At least one commentator questions whether Congressional regulation of Internet gaming can pass the three-part test for Commerce Clause
regulation set out in United States. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). David Goodman, Proposals for a Federal Prohibition of Internet Gambling: Are There Any Other Viable Solutions to
This Perplexing Problem?, 70 MISS. L.J. 375, 396-98 (2000). Lopez delineates three areas
in which Congress may regulate under the Commerce Clause: 1) activities that use the
channels of interstate commerce such as roads, railroads, and phone lines; 2) activities that
implicate instrumentalities of interstate commerce including people and things moving in
interstate commerce; and 3) activities that have a “substantial relation to interstate commerce.” Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559. Goodman questions whether Internet gambling has the
necessary “substantial relation” in order to pass muster under Lopez. Goodman, supra
note 46, at 396-98.
47 NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 2-15 to 2-16.
48 Pari-mutuel betting is a system commonly used for gambling on horse and dog
races in which all money bet on a race is divided for payment to bettors holding tickets for
first, second, or third place after a statutorily determined deduction for maintenance and
profits. See generally IND. CODE § 4-31-2-12 (2002); NEV. REV. STAT. 466.028 (2001); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 41-3.1-6 (2001); W. Flagler Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 486
(1954).
49 Kish, supra note 16, at 458.
50 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
51 Kish, supra note 16, at 457. A question arises as to whether placing purely intrastate wagers violates the Federal Wire Act since the same lines of communication are used
for both intrastate and interstate wire communications. Federal fraud statutes may be
instructive. Fraud by wire, radio, or television are unlike mail fraud in that the criminal
activity must cross state lines in order to give rise to a federal offense. 18 U.S.C. § 1343
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States v. Lopez stated, “we have upheld a wide variety of congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we have
concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate commerce.”52 Federal regulation of purely intrastate gaming activity
would also place Congress in the awkward position of regulating
the same types of gaming that are traditionally regulated by the
states under the police power.53 Commerce Clause jurisprudence
leaves open the question of whether Congress can prevent states
from developing their own strictly intrastate Internet gaming
systems.
While questions remain about Congress’s ability to regulate
intrastate Internet gaming, the Commerce Clause clearly gives
Congress the power to regulate interstate gaming via the Internet. The breadth of Congress’s power under the Commerce
Clause and the fact that Congress already has the power to tax
wagers leave little room to question Congress’s power to make
laws that regulate Internet gaming.54
2. The Federal Wager Tax
The federal government currently has the ability to collect
taxes on wagers regardless of whether the wagers are authorized
under state law. The Federal Excise Wagering Tax allows the federal government to collect a tax equal to 0.25 percent of the
amount of any state authorized wager.55 The federal government
collects a tax of two percent on any wager not authorized by state
law.56 The tax applies to any person, or corporation, engaged in
(2001) (“Whoever . . . transmits . . . by means of wire, radio, or television communication in
interstate or foreign commerce, any writings . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme
or artifice.”) (emphasis added). This is in contradiction to the rule for mail fraud, which
dictates that any use of the mails for fraudulent activity, whether interstate or intrastate,
gives rise to a federal offense. Id. § 341; Annulli v. Panikkar, 200 F.3d 189, 200 n.9 (3rd
Cir. 1999) (“There are two elements of a mail or wire fraud charge: ‘. . . a scheme to defraud, and . . . a mailing or wire in furtherance of that scheme.’ Wholly intrastate use of
the mails for fraud violates the mail fraud statute. In contrast, the federal wire fraud statute requires interstate use of the wire.”) (citations omitted); Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360,
1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating wire communications must cross state lines in order to satisfy
the statute and purely intrastate communications are beyond the reach of the statute).
52 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559.
53 Goodman, supra note 46, at 398.
54 See discussion infra Part II.A.2 (discussing federal wagering tax).
55 I.R.C. § 4401(a)(1) (West 2002).
56 Id. § 4401(a)(2). The use of the dual rate structure is not considered an improper
penalty on unauthorized wagers because of the likelihood of a higher rate of return on such
unauthorized wagers. United States v. Hallmark, 911 F.2d 399, 401 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 297 (1935)). The dual structure does not
violate tax uniformity requirements because the distinction between legal and illegal wagering is geographically neutral. Hallmark, 911 F.2d at 402. However, the wagering tax
has been successfully challenged on Fifth Amendment prohibition of self-incrimination
grounds. See Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (reversing petitioner’s conviction for tax evasion on the grounds that public registration for occupational Wagering Tax
Stamp would constitute self incrimination since local Internal Revenue Service offices
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the business of accepting wagers.57 The tax also applies to any
wager placed in a wagering pool or lottery.58
The wagering excise tax may appear to be an easy fix for the
collection of Internet gaming revenue. However, the definition of
what is covered under the statute and exceptions to the tax may
cause problems in applying it to Internet gaming. Wagers covered
by the tax may not be broad enough to include Internet gaming.
The definition of “wager” under the statute is limited to:
(A) any wager with respect to a sports event or a contest placed
with a person engaged in the business of accepting such wagers,
(B) any wager placed in a wagering pool with respect to a sports
event or a contest, if such pool is conducted for profit, and (C)
any wager placed in a lottery conducted for profit.59

The clear language of the statute includes sports books within its
scope, but not necessarily casino type games.
No cases have decided the issue of whether “contest” in the
Federal Wagering Excise Tax Act may be expanded to include casino games. However, the statute has been broadly construed
thus far to exclude only bets that are purely social or friendly.60 In
United States v. Simon, the court upheld the appellant’s tax evasion conviction for accepting bets on sporting events.61 He argued
on appeal that he was not in the business of taking wagers because he did not derive most of his living from the wagering business or engage in the business for profit.62 The court disagreed
stating, “The purpose of the language engaged in the business of
accepting wagers was to exclude from coverage of the Act only bets
of the purely social or friendly type.”63
In another case, the statute was construed to cover betting
that provided intangible benefits such as increased publicity and
goodwill instead of direct profit.64 The district court held that the
application of I.R.C. § 4421 was overbroad in cases where only an
indirect profit is realized.65 The Court of Appeals reversed, holding, “There is nothing in the word ‘profit’ . . . which indicates that
the gain referred to must be derived from the wagering pool itshared registration information with state law enforcement authority); see also Grosso v.
United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968) (expanding holding of Marchetti to include monthly payments of Wager Tax since reporting was regularly shared with state prosecuting
authorities).
57 I.R.C. § 4401(c).
58 Id.
59 Id. § 4421(1) (2000).
60 United States v. Simon, 241 F.2d 308, 310 (7th Cir. 1957).
61 Id. at 312.
62 Id. at 309.
63 Id. at 310 (internal quotation omitted).
64 United States v. D.I. Operating Co., 362 F.2d 305 (9th Cir. 1966).
65 Id. at 306.
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self.”66 More important for the current discussion, the court examined the legislative intent of the statute and found, “The
committee reports . . . reveal that [the excise tax] was intended to
make ‘commercialized gambling’ help meet ‘the present need for
increased revenue . . . .’ ”67
If the language of the wagering tax is interpreted in the same
way as language in the Wire Act, the tax will not apply to Internet
casino games. The federal Wire Act68 contains a similar definition
of wager,69 and a federal district court in In re MasterCard recently held that the Wire Act does not apply to casino style Internet gambling.70 Plaintiffs alleged that credit card companies
and issuing banks violated the Wire Act by engaging in “a worldwide gambling enterprise” when they assisted Internet casinos in
transmission of Internet casino and sports wagers and gambling
debt collection.71 The court held that defendants’ business relationship with Internet casinos did not violate the Wire Act prohibition against transmission of gambling information because the
Wire Act prohibition does not include casino gambling or other
games of chance.72 According to the court, the plain language of
the Wire Act treats “event” and “contests” as both being modified
by “sporting.”73
The definition of “lottery” in the wagering excise tax statute
may also be problematic in applying the wagering tax to Internet
gaming. Under the statute, lotteries do not include games in
which “the distribution of prizes or other property is made, in the
presence of all persons placing wagers in such game.”74 This definition excludes any table game or slot machine in a “brick and
Id. at 308.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
The Federal Excise Wagering Tax places a tax on “any wager with respect to a
sports event or a contest.” I.R.C. § 4421(1) (emphasis added). Similarly, the Wire Act includes within its scope persons who use wire communication facilities to place “bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest.” 18 U.S.C. 1084(a) (emphasis added).
70 In re MasterCard Int’l, Inc. Internet Gambling Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La.
2001).
71 Id. at 475 (internal quotation omitted).
72 Id. at 481.
73 Id. at 480. The court also cited case law to support its conclusion. Specifically, the
court cited United States v. Sellers, 483 F.2d 37, 45 (5th Cir. 1973) (overruled on other
grounds by United States v. McKeever, 905 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1990)) (“The statute deals
with bookmakers . . . .”); United States v. Marder, 474 F.2d 1192, 1194 (5th Cir. 1973)
(stating the government satisfied the first element of the statute when it proved defendant
provided information relative to sporting events); and United States v. Kaczowski, 114 F.
Supp. 2d 143, 153 (W.D.N.Y. 2000) (finding that plain reading of the statute demonstrates
the criminality of placing bets or wagers on any sporting event or contest using interstate
or foreign communication). The in re MasterCard court went on to discuss recent legislative attempts to amend the Wire Act to include games of chance, and prohibit Internet
gambling entirely through the passage of the Internet Gambling Prohibition Act of 1999.
In re MasterCard, 132 F. Supp. 2d at 480-81.
74 I.R.C. § 4421(2)(A)(iii) (2001).
66
67
68
69
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mortar” casino because people are physically present when wagering and when winnings are distributed. However, the statute is
still applicable for two reasons. First, lotteries are not the only
form of wagering covered under the statute. Wagering on sporting
events and contests also falls under the statute. Second, Internet
gamblers are not physically present when wagering or when accepting winnings. Therefore, even if Internet gaming is considered a lottery or other similar type of wager, the statute does not
preclude collection of the tax because people wagering are only
present on the Internet and not physically in the casino.75
Several statutory exceptions exist to the § 4401 wager tax.76
First, pari-mutuel betting is exempted from the tax.77 This exemption is inapplicable to Internet gaming if the bettor is betting
against the house and not in a pool with other bettors. The second
exemption is for coin-operated devices.78 This exemption also does
not apply to Internet gaming because the bettor would necessarily
be using digital cash, a credit card, or a separate bank account.
The final exemption is for state-conducted lotteries and other
sweepstakes or wagering pools conducted by an agency of the
state acting under state law.79 This exemption will not apply to
Internet gaming run by private parties like casinos. If states run
their own Internet gaming sites, then these sites would be exempt
from the § 4401 wagering tax. Such a system would presumably
obviate the need for federal intervention provided states allow
only their own citizens to play and exclude those who are not
permitted.80
The wagering excise tax provides an effective means for the
federal government to collect revenue from Internet gaming providers. The statute has been tested in the courts and has passed
constitutional muster to date.81 While the definition of activities
covered under the wagering tax may need to be expanded to encompass Internet casino gaming, none of the exemptions preclude
its application to Internet gaming. However, the states must be
able to share in the revenue collected by the federal government in
order to make application of § 4401 attractive to the states.

Id. § 4421(2).
Id. § 4402.
77 Id. § 4402(1).
78 Id. § 4402 (2).
79 Id. § 4402 (3).
80 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing state police power). Nevada recently enacted a bill
to allow Internet gaming by its own citizens provided casinos can exclude minors and people in jurisdictions that do not allow gambling. Brunker, Net Betting, supra note 6.
81 See discussion supra note 56.
75
76
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3. Federal Revenue Sharing With the States
Distribution of revenue to the states after collection by the
federal government is the next hurdle to a federal regulatory system.82 Federal revenue sharing with the states is not a new concept. States receive a large part of their revenues through federal
revenue sharing programs initiated in the early part of the twentieth century.83 Revenue sharing programs were developed in response to federal retention of land that had previously been
transferred to private use.84 Since state and local governments
are prohibited from taxing federal land, states were deprived of
property tax revenue when the federal government retained lands
for national parks and forests.85 Congress enacted laws to share
national forest timber production and user fees,86 onshore mineral
production,87 federal lands grazing fees,88 and payments in lieu of
taxes for certain lands held by the federal government89 in order to
decrease the burden of federal lands on the states.90 Some of the
revenue sharing laws have been curtailed in recent years because
of the federal government’s desire to retain revenue and encourage development through preferential leases; however, federal land use revenue sharing remains an important part of state
budgets.91
Congress has also approved revenue sharing among the
states where no federal lands were involved. Such sharing of revenues was approved when Congress allowed the formation of the
Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.92 The Port Authority
compact was formed by New York and New Jersey in 1834, and
approved by Congress as required under Article 1, § 10 of the Constitution.93 The agreement between New York and New Jersey allows the two states to share “toll revenues to various facilities
within the Port Authority’s network.”94
82 See discussion infra note 130 and accompanying text regarding the tax “nexus” required in order for states to impose a direct tax on out-of-state casinos.
83 Michael E. Shapiro, Sagebrush and Seaweed Robbery: State Revenue Losses from
Onshore and Offshore Federal Lands, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 481, 485-87 (1985).
84 Id. at 485-86.
85 Id.
86 16 U.S.C. § 500 (2000).
87 30 U.S.C. § 191 (2001).
88 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1986).
89 31 U.S.C. §§ 6901-06 (1983).
90 Shapiro, supra note 83, at 485-86.
91 Id. at 482-83. The federal government contributed almost $500 million to states
from onshore mineral leasing programs in 1983; approximately $225 million from forestry
leases in 1984; and “over $100 million as payments in lieu of taxes in 1984.” Id. at 482.
92 N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAW § 6401 n.1 (McKinney 2000) (1834 agreement between New
York and New Jersey “consented to by Congress, Act June 28, 1834, c. 126, 4 Stat. 798”).
93 Fort Lee v. Port Auth., No. CIV.A.87-1238, 1988 WL 24146, at *3 (D.N.J. Mar. 14,
1988).
94 Id. at *1.
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Congress could act under either federal revenue sharing laws
or allow states to pass their own laws regulating Internet gaming.
Federal revenue sharing has the advantage of centralized tax collection. Tax statutes, such as the Federal Wagering Excise Tax,
would be employed to collect taxes. Gaming taxes could then be
distributed to states that allow Internet gaming by their citizens.
Federal collection and distribution provides a fairly efficient
means of accomplishing the goals of Internet gaming regulation.
Federal revenue sharing would also avoid some of the bureaucratic problems that would arise under cooperative agreements
among the states.95
B. State Regulation
1. The Police Power
States traditionally regulate gambling under their police powers.96 The police power allows states to regulate in the interest of
the health, safety, morals, and welfare of citizens.97 Gambling has
historically been regulated by the states under the police power
because gambling is considered a vice activity that affects the morality of citizens.98 The police power gives states the authority to
regulate gaming to the point of completely banning all gaming activity within the borders of the state.99
Federal gaming regulation has been designed and used to assist states in enforcing gambling regulations. The federal government yields to the wishes of the states in determining gambling
policy because states are better able to determine the will of the
people.100 The federal Wire Act prohibits people in the business of
betting and wagering from using wire communications to take
bets in interstate or foreign commerce on any sporting event or
contest.101 However, the Wire Act has an important exception for
the use of wire communication facilities to transmit information to
be used for news reporting or to assist bettors in placing bets on
See discussion infra Part III.
See supra note 45.
See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law and order—these are some of the more conspicuous examples of
the traditional application of the police power to municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the power and do not delimit it.”).
98 See Thomas v. Bible, 694 F. Supp. 750, 759-60 (D. Nev. 1988) (“Licensed gaming is a
privilege conferred by the state and does not carry with it the rights inherent in useful
trades and occupations. . . . Licensed gaming is a matter reserved to the states within the
meaning of the Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.”) (citations omitted);
Rose, Understanding the Law, supra note 6, at 181.
99 Peter Brown, Regulation of Cybercasinos and Internet Gambling, 547 PLI/Pat 9, 14
(2000). Most states currently allow some form of gambling whether casinos, lotteries, Indian gaming, or, more recently, riverboat casinos. Only two states, Utah and Hawaii, have
complete bans on all gambling activities. Id.
100 Goodman, supra note 46, at 379.
101 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2000).
95
96
97
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sporting events between states where such bets are legal.102
States determine the legality of placing wagers while the Wire Act
assists “prohibitionist states in keeping their citizens free from operators based in foreign jurisdictions.”103 The Wire Act and other
federal statutes do not determine the legality of gambling in any
particular state or for the nation as a whole. Rather, federal statutes assist states in effectively enforcing their own laws by providing a federal cause of action against violators whom states would
otherwise have difficulty prosecuting.
Several issues arise for states applying the police power to Internet gaming. First, states have a problem with inconsistency.
For example, if a state passed a law that criminalized acceptance
of wagers by parties located outside the state but allowed acceptance of wagers by casinos inside the state, the effect of the law
would be to create a double standard in which the type of activity
allowed in the legislating state is prohibited in other states.104
Such a law would also violate the Dormant Commerce Clause,
which prevents states from enforcing laws that facially discriminate against commerce in other states in areas where Congress
has not acted.105 When states pass legislation that facially discriminates against commerce in areas that Congress has not acted, courts will apply strict scrutiny to hold the legislation
“virtually per se invalid . . . unless the state can show that [the
legislation] advances a legitimate local purpose that cannot be adequately served by reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives.”106
A state law that allows acceptance of bets by casinos within the
state while prohibiting acceptance of bets by casinos outside the
state discriminates by restricting commercial activity outside the
state while allowing—and possibly encouraging—the same type of
activity by casinos located within the legislating state. A law of
this type would clearly impact interstate and foreign commerce
Id. § 1084(b).
Rose, Statutes and International Law, supra note 7, at 237; see also United States v.
Southard, 700 F.2d 1, 20 (1st Cir. 1983) (“Section 1084 (a) was not passed to protect bettors
from their gambling proclivities. Its stated purpose was to assist the states in enforcing
their own laws against gambling.”); H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 2633 (1961):
102
103

The purpose of this legislation is to assist the various States, territories, and possessions of the United States and the District of Columbia in the enforcement of
their laws pertaining to gambling, bookmaking, and like offenses and to aid in the
suppression of organized gambling activities by prohibiting the use of or the leasing, furnishing, or maintaining of wire communication facilities which are or will
be used for the transmission of certain gambling information in interstate and
foreign commerce.
Id. (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General of the United States).
104 Rose, Understanding the Law, supra note 6, at 201.
105 Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 79 (1st Cir.
2001).
106 Id. (internal quotation omitted).

296

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 5:281

since it would cut off the flow of money from the legislating state
to other jurisdictions.
Finally, the police power only gives states the authority to
regulate gaming within their borders. It does not provide a workable model that allows states to benefit from the revenues that
can be generated by Internet gaming. For such a model, states
will have to turn to existing cooperative ventures or build a workable system from the ground up.
2. Multi-State Lotteries
Multi-state lotteries such as Powerball provide a possible
model for states to regulate Internet gaming. Multi-state lotteries
have become popular in the past ten years because of their promise to provide much needed state funding.107 The lure of Internet
gaming for states is similar, provided states can actually realize
revenue from Internet gaming. While multi-state lotteries appear
to be an obvious parallel to Internet gaming, important differences preclude using a multi-state lottery type system as a regulatory model for Internet gaming.
a. Structure
Multi-state lotteries are cooperative ventures between states’
independent lottery commissions. State lottery associations run
multi-state lotteries in their home states, and any revenue generated by the sale of multi-state lottery tickets stays within the
state where the ticket is sold.108 The Multi-State Lottery Association is a non-profit organization owned and operated by the various state lotteries.109 Powerball, which is run by the Multi-State
Lottery Association, is a fifty percent payout game; therefore,
states must pay back fifty cents in prize money for every dollar
spent on tickets.110 Individual states are responsible for paying
small cash prizes, and all of the states contribute to a common
prize pool for jackpots.111 This arrangement allows states with
smaller populations such as Rhode Island and South Dakota to
participate in a lottery with a much larger prize pool than can be
107 Powerball is the largest of the multi-state lotteries. Currently twenty-two states
participate in Powerball or other games administered by the Multi-State Lottery Association. States currently participating in the Multi-State Lottery Association are Arizona,
Colorado, Connecticut, District of Columbia, Delaware, Indiana, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Wisconsin, and West Virginia. Multi-State Lottery
Association , About MUSL, at http://www.musl.com/muslabout.shtm (last visited Mar. 26,
2002).
108 Multi-State Lottery Association, Frequently Asked Questions, at http://www.musl.
com/faq.shtm (last visited Mar. 26, 2002) [hereinafter Frequently Asked Questions].
109 Id.
110 Id.
111 Id.
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generated by the states’ residents alone. The payoff for the states
is that each state can use the revenue generated by the multistate lottery in any way its legislature deems appropriate.112
Despite the fact that multi-state lotteries are obvious cooperative ventures between the states, the lotteries do not appear to be
in violation of the Interstate Compacts Clause.113 No federal
courts have ruled on this issue, but in Tichenor v. Missouri State
Lottery Commission,114 the Supreme Court of Missouri held that
Missouri’s participation in the Multi-State Lottery Association did
not violate the Interstate Compacts Clause because the multistate lottery was not a threat to the federal government’s sovereignty.115 The court reasoned, “The purpose of the federal constitutional provision is to protect the federal government against
threats to its sovereignty by reason of combinations of states.”116
The multi-state lottery cooperative agreement is not a threat to
sovereignty because the agreement exists “to foster a gambling enterprise designed to benefit the treasuries of participating states
. . . [but] Congress retains its power to regulate lotteries to the full
extent of its delegated powers.”117 Congress has not asserted its
power to regulate or prohibit multi-state lotteries to date. While
questions remain about the constitutionality of multi-state lotteries because of the lack of congressional activity and federal litigation, the states have decided the issue in favor of retaining the
lotteries.
b. Applicability: Physical v. Internet Presence and
Public v. Private Control
Despite their apparent legality and success in generating revenue, multi-state lotteries do not provide a workable model for Internet gaming revenue collection and allocation. Two problems
arise with applying the multi-state lottery model to Internet gaming. First, lottery laws prohibit the purchase of lottery tickets
across state lines, while interstate Internet gaming by definition
requires the transmission of money and bets across state lines.
Second, multi-state lotteries are state run while Internet gaming
will be conducted by privately held casinos and bookmakers.
112 Examples of lottery revenue use include “mass transportation in Arizona; economic
development in Kansas; natural resources in Minnesota; school aid and crime control in
Montana; senior citizens and state parks in West Virginia; [and] property tax relief in Wisconsin.” Id.
113 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. (“No State shall, without consent of Congress . . . enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State . . . .”)
114 742 S.W.2d 170 (Mo. 1988).
115 Id. at 176.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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Multi-state lottery tickets must be purchased in a state sponsoring the lottery; the sale of tickets is not permitted over the Internet.118 Lottery tickets may be purchased through the mail or on
a subscription basis, but the person ordering the tickets or subscription must live within a state sponsoring the lottery.119 The
Multi-State Lottery Association carefully spells out rules regarding transportation of lottery tickets across state or international
lines. The Association rules cite 18 U.S.C. § 1301, which provides:
Whoever brings into the United States for the purpose of disposing of the same, or knowingly deposits with any express company or other common carrier for carriage, or carries in
interstate or foreign commerce any paper, certificate, or instrument purporting to be or to represent a ticket, chance, share, or
interest in or dependent upon the event of a lottery . . . or, being
engaged in the business of procuring for a person in 1 State such
a ticket, chance, share, or interest in a lottery, gift, enterprise or
similar scheme conducted by another State (unless that business is permitted under an agreement between the States in
question or appropriate authorities of those States), knowingly
transmits in interstate or foreign commerce information to be
used for the purpose of procuring such a ticket, chance, share, or
interest; or knowingly takes or receives any such paper, certificate, instrument, advertisement, or list so brought, deposited, or
transported, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than two years, or both.120

The statue is interpreted to include only those who are in the business of selling lottery tickets outside the tickets’ state of origin.121
Therefore, a person who lives in a state that is not part of the
Multi-State Lottery Association may purchase a Powerball ticket
so long as: it is purchased in a state while physically present in
that state;122 the purchaser is not purchasing the ticket with the
intent to dispose of the ticket in another state; and the entire
transaction is completed in the state permitting the lottery.123
Internet gaming, on the other hand, assumes that players will
place bets across state lines. In fact, it is the ability of the Internet to communicate rapidly across large distances and jurisdictional lines that makes it such an attractive medium for gaming.
Internet technology allows gamblers to place bets in their own
homes; whether the state in which the gambler lives has “brick
and mortar” casinos or sports books is immaterial. The Internet
gambler does not have to physically cross state lines in order to
118
119
120
121
122
123

Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 108.
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1301 (2000).
Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 108.
Id.
Id.
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place a wager as a lottery player would do if his or her home state
did not have a lottery. If an Internet gaming company accepts
bets from out of state residents, it is guilty of the very conduct the
Multi-State Lottery Association seeks to avoid by restricting sales
of lottery tickets to physical purchases within states that license
or sponsor lottery games.
The second major difference between multi-state lotteries and
Internet gaming is that the lotteries are owned and administered
by state governments,124 while Internet gaming sites are generally
owned and operated by privately held corporations. For example,
Rupert Murdoch is heavily invested in Sports Internet Group
PLC, an Australian company that takes wagers from people in the
United States;125 Ladbroke’s, Coral, Stanley Leisure, and William
Hill are Britain’s largest bookmakers, and all plan to close their
offshore Internet operations and open sites in Britain as soon as a
regulatory system is in place;126 and casinos in the United States
support regulation of Internet gaming so they can open sites and
capitalize on additional revenues.127 No current plans exist for
state run casinos or Internet gaming sites.
The fact that Internet gaming will be a private enterprise
complicates any regulatory scheme and makes imposing a system
similar to the multi-state lottery difficult. States that allow multistate lotteries have direct control over the lottery in their own
state, and each state owns a share in administrative bodies such
as the Multi-State Lottery Association.128 States will not have the
same type of direct control over for-profit Internet casinos or
sports books in other states. At the very least, Internet gaming
will force states to impose one more level of regulation such as a
compact for collection of revenues between a state that allows casino gaming and a state that allows its residents to place wagers
in another state via the Internet.
An illustration of the differences and complications may be
helpful. Under the multi-state lottery system, Rhode Island sells
Powerball tickets and keeps the revenue from those tickets with
the exception of money that must be paid into the common jackpot
prize pool.129 Rhode Island does not have to depend on any other
state for collection of lottery revenue. Conversely, if Rhode Island
allowed Internet gaming but did not allow physical full service
casinos, it would have to contract for collection of revenue with a
state that allows physical casinos such as Nevada. Rhode Island
124 See generally KAN. STAT. ANN. § 74-8731 (2000); Louisiana Lottery Corporation, at
http://www.lalottery.com/about.html (last visited Mar. 26, 2002).
125 Rose, Understanding the Law, supra note 6, at 205.
126 Brunker, Britain Embraces, supra note 1.
127 Brunker, Online Gambling, supra note 17.
128 See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
129 Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 108.
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cannot impose a direct tax on Nevada casinos since Rhode Island
does not have a sufficient “tax nexus” with Nevada casinos.130
Rhode Island would also have difficulty determining the amount
of Internet gaming by its citizens in Nevada. Therefore, Rhode
Island would have to depend on Nevada to regulate casinos and
turn over revenue generated by Rhode Island bettors. Such a system is complicated for states whose citizens place bets and for
states taking bets over the Internet since those states will have a
reporting responsibility to other states.
III.

PROPOSALS

FOR

INTERNET GAMING TAX REGULATION

Most scholarship on Internet gaming to date has focused on
the merits of prohibition versus regulation or the difficulty of enforcing a ban on Internet gaming; little attention has been given
to the positive impacts of workable regulation and what might
constitute workable regulation. Articles that focus on regulatory
models do not provide sufficient incentive for states to adopt regulation.131 In order for well regulated Internet gaming to become a
reality in the United States, states must be able to realize some
benefit from allowing their citizens to place wagers via the Internet. Each of the following proposals would allow state and federal governments to realize revenue from Internet gaming, while
maintaining states’ traditional authority to regulate gaming
under the police power.
A. Opt In Provisions for the States
Congress could amend the Federal Wager Excise Tax132 to include a provision for states to “opt in” to a federal tax collection
program on Internet gaming sites. At the same time, Congress
130 See Tom W. Bell, All’s Not Fair in Internet Tax Wars: Those Buying Over the Web
Shouldn’t Pay for Unused Infrastructure, L.A. DAILY J., Feb. 1, 2001, at 6, available at
http://www.tomwbell.com/writings/TaxWars.html. Bell argues that a long standing Supreme Court precedent prohibiting states from collecting taxes on purchases made by consumers in states where retailers do not have a physical presence should be applied to
Internet purchases because purchases over the Internet consume fewer public services
than purchases made in traditional malls and shopping centers. Similarly, Internet casinos do not place the same strain on public services as physical casinos, and states that only
allow gaming over the Internet will not have sufficient contacts with gaming providers to
enforce tax laws. Id.
131 See Michael P. Kailus, Do Not Bet on Unilateral Prohibition of Internet Gambling to
Eliminate Cyber-Casinos, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 1045, 1068 (1999). Kalius proposes a “Seal
of Approval” regulatory model for Internet casinos. Id. at 1080. Under this model, Internet
casinos that meet licensing requirements would receive a “Seal of Approval” from the regulatory body. Id. In order to obtain a license, operators would have to “demonstrat[e] a clear
ability to provide major prizes as promised to players” and undergo background checks. Id.
The problem with this model is that there is no incentive for states to adopt regulation as
opposed to an outright ban. The model provides some protection for consumers, but states
can achieve the same protection through a ban.
132 I.R.C. § 4401 (West 2002).
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could amend the statute to allocate a percentage of the tax to
states that allow their citizens to gamble on the Internet. Under
this regulatory model, the Internal Revenue Service would collect
taxes from Internet gaming providers. Providers would be under
an obligation to report all Internet wagers and pay taxes on those
wagers much as casinos currently report income and pay taxes.
Electronic records of all wagers placed over the Internet would facilitate reporting.133
A federal “opt in” program has two primary advantages.
First, much of the legal and bureaucratic infrastructure needed to
collect and distribute tax revenue is already in place; the modification should not impose significant new costs. The Federal Wager
Excise Tax, with minor modification, is applicable to Internet
gaming, and the federal government already has sophisticated
revenue sharing programs with the states. The method of taxation and distribution of funds from Internet gaming would not be
significantly different from methods employed for collection and
distribution of mineral, timber, and grazing fees. The second advantage to an “opt in” program is that states maintain their police
powers by having the choice of whether to allow citizens to gamble
on the Internet. By using registration software, casinos will be
able to determine the origin of wagers to make sure people are not
placing wagers from states that do not wish to participate in the
program. Of course, citizens of those states will still be able to
access offshore Internet gaming sites, but they will not enjoy the
protections of highly regulated American casinos.
B. State Distribution Under Federal Supervision
Another possible regulatory model would be to have states
with casinos collect and distribute taxes to states that allow Internet gaming. The primary advantage to this model is that it
leaves the majority of regulation in the hands of the states. States
would decide whether to allow Internet gaming, and they would
negotiate with provider states for the best possible deal. As with
the “opt in” model, casinos would have electronic records that facilitate accounting.
The problem with this model is that transaction costs to the
states will be higher. Provider states will have to account for wagers placed by citizens of non-provider states, and non-provider
states will have to make sure provider states are being honest in
their accounting. Mistrust between the states could lead to increased litigation among the states over gaming revenues. Staterun regulation will also increase transaction costs by forcing
states to enter and administer multiple compacts between pro133

Schneider testimony, supra note 40.
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vider and non-provider states. Not only would provider states
have compacts with each non-provider state that allowed its citizens to gamble on the Internet, non-provider states would also
enter multiple compacts with provider states. This may lead to a
sort of forum shopping wherein one provider state would promise
higher returns than another and non-provider states would use
existing compacts to coerce better returns. A state-run system
would likely prove to be too complicated and too contentious to
help states effectively achieve their regulatory goals.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Internet gaming is not an issue that will simply go away. Internet casinos have emerged as the newest form of gambling, and
there is no indication that the number of sites offering gambling
will decrease. Americans are unlikely to curtail their gaming activities on the Internet.134 The likelihood of legalization of Internet gaming gives rise to the need for regulation. Congress and
the states must change their attitude toward Internet gaming in
order to prevent underage and problem gambling and insure fair
games on the Internet. However, lawmakers will not be willing to
make these changes unless they have some incentive.
Existing laws allow the federal government to collect and distribute revenue from Internet gaming. Employing the Federal
Wager Excise Tax and revenue sharing statutes is the most efficient means of providing legislatures with the incentive they need.
States will maintain their traditional police power to regulate
gambling within their borders by choosing whether they wish to
“opt in” to the federal program. States could also expect the assistance of gaming providers who have an interest in keeping their
licenses and realizing additional profits. This incentive will encourage providers to develop better software that will curtail underage and problem gambling.
Cooperation by private, federal, and state entities is the best,
and possibly only, way to control burgeoning Internet gaming.
Regulation by state and federal governments would allow reliable
operators to open gaming sites in the United States that offer
greater consumer protection and encourage bettors to place wagers at domestic casinos. Federal and state governments could
then tax operators and realize revenue from an otherwise untapped source. Now is the time to take the necessary steps to keep
more revenue from going to offshore sites.

134 See generally NGISC FINAL REPORT, supra note 13, at 2-15 to 2-16; Jon Baumgarten
et al., Washington Watch, CYBERSPACE LAW. vol. 6 No. 6, at 13 (2001).

